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Abstract 
This article consists of a comparative analysis of the evolution of TV rights in English and 
French men’s football first divisions over the period 1980-2020. The focus is on four main 
independent variables: the characteristics of the sporting event, the structure of the TV market, 
the financial situation of subscription channels and the penetration of the sport in society 
(watching). Based on this, a framework is suggested with the identification of 16 more specific 
independent variables. Correlations are calculated between these variables and TV rights in 
England and France. They allow us to explain why TV rights for the former have become much 
larger than for the latter. This can be summarised as follows: larger domestic audiences for the 
English Premier League (EPL) leading to larger revenues for Sky in the United Kingdom and 
Ireland than Canal + in France with a greater incentive to invest money in TV rights due to 
more competition leading to better players so better games and larger audiences; and much 
larger international TV rights for the EPL than for the French Ligue 1 due to the quality of the 
games and the ability to “sell” the league internationally, in particular in attracting international 
players. 
Keywords: men’s football, TV rights, England, France. 




On 10 February 2015, it was announced that the national TV rights for the English Premier 
League (EPL) will reach a record £5.136bn (€6.68bn for £1 = €1.3) for the three seasons from 
2016-2017 to 2018-2019 (BBC, 2015). This could mean a league’s overall broadcast revenue 
around £8.4bn (€10.92bn) for these three seasons once the international sales will be completed 
(Daily Mail, 2016; ESPN, 2015). These possible £2.8bn (€3.64bn) per season have to be 
compared with the annual £2.6m (€3.38m in current euros) for the 1983-1985 period, when the 
first televised live English Football League (EFL) matches were shown (Gratton & Solberg, 
2007, pp. 4-5). This indicates the dramatic increase in TV rights for English football from the 
1980s, also true to a lesser extent in French football. Indeed, national TV rights for the latter 
have increased from €0.8m in 1984-1985 to €748.5m per season for the period 2016-2020 
(Wikipédia, 1). 
In this article, the objective is to compare the evolution of TV rights in English and French 
men’s football first divisions over the period 1980-2020 with a perspective both economic and 
historical (Szymanski, 2015), and an approach mainly quantitative (Vamplew, 2015, 2016) but 
with the use of numbers sometimes based on qualitative assessment. A comparative analysis 
on sports broadcasting markets has proved to be insightful (Smith, Evens & Iosifidis, 2015). 
The justification for the comparison between the English and French leagues is that the UK 
and French markets are quite similar in terms of population (around 65m in 2015) and gross 
domestic product (around $45,000 per capita in 2014) and broadcasted live games appeared 
almost at the same time in both territories. The structure is as follows. The first section reviews 
the literature about the history of TV rights in professional team sports both in the USA and in 
Europe before dealing with the independent variables of the amount for broadcasting rights. 
The second section provides the framework which is developed to analyse the evolution of TV 
rights in English and French football with the identification of the criteria we focus on. The 
third section describes the methodology used. The fourth section presents the results along with 
their discussion. The conclusion sums up the article and compares TV rights for the EPL with 
the National Football League (NFL), the American football league which generates the highest 
level of TV rights in the world. 
 
Literature review 
The History of Pay-TV Football in the UK 
The economic history of the relationship between television and sport in the UK is long and well 
established (Haynes, 2016). This symbiotic relationship, where sport provides a valued form of content 
to media organisations who provide valued revenue to sport, has become what Rowe (2011) has 
characterised as a ‘match made in heaven’. As Evens et al (2013) have suggested, following Kuhn 
(2007), this symbiotic relationship has had three phases of gestation: firstly, a public service 
monopoly/duopoly first dominated by the BBC and subsequently shared with the commercial regional 
franchises of ITV; second, following deregulation and privatisation of telecommunications under the 
1984 Cable and Broadcasting Act and the 1990 Broadcasting Act, British television saw a period of 
expansion from the early 1980’s to the mid-1990’s with new free-to-air broadcasters Channel 4 (1982) 
and Channel 5 (1997) and new cable and direct-to-home satellite services, most notably British Sky 
Broadcasting (1990); thirdly, the more recent phase driven by digital television delivery systems across 
digital terrestrial, digital cable and digital satellite licences. As we shall discuss below, we may now 
add a fourth phase of UK television development which includes Internet television services, with 
video-on-demand services and ‘over-the-top’ (OTT) services being developed in a period that Hutchins 
and Rowe (2012) have labelled ‘Networked Media Sport’ in an age of ‘digital plenitude’. Sport, as a 
form of content that delivers a ‘ready-made audience’, and has arguably played a central role in the 
evolution and development of each of these phases of television. However, the impact of each phase of 
television has been motivated by quite divergent objectives, as well as creating quite varied and nuanced 
outcomes both across and within sports.  
 
The first phase of television reminds us what the economic transaction between television and sport 
actually is. The BBC paid for a facility fee for the ‘right’ to place their cameras at sport as early as 1937, 
but it was not until the 1950’s that such fees became regularised in the contractual arrangements 
between television and sport (Haynes, 2016). The ‘rights’ in question are not intellectual property rights, 
but a right of access in to the sporting arena to broadcast the event. Governing bodies of sport were, for 
many years, nervous of the impact of television on their gate receipts, and for a while were particularly 
worried about what was termed the ‘rediffusion’ of television in public places, such as cinemas. The 
football authorities were especially concerned, and kept live coverage to a handful of occasions such as 
the FA Cup final, European club competitions and international matches (Haynes, 1998). As television 
developed, the rights of access became increasingly competitive as each broadcaster sought 
‘exclusivity’ to cover events. However, to the early regulators of broadcasting exclusivity was deemed 
antithetical to the broader need to develop the medium among the British population, so to avoid the 
monopolisation of sport events the Postmaster General introduced an agreed set of ‘listed events’ of 
major sporting occasions which were deemed to be in the national interest (Barnett, 1990). The net 
effect of this list was to suppress the value of ‘facility fees’ for the right to televise major events, where 
both the BBC and ITV shared coverage. This state of affairs structured the duopoly of the BBC/ITV 
cartel from the mid-1950’s to the late-1980’s. Competition centred on a ratings war between the two 
channels televising the same events and leagues, rather than a battle over exclusivity. The cosy-duopoly 
over rights was broken in a significant way when ITV bought exclusive rights to live First Division 
football matches in a four-year deal with the Football League worth £44m from 1988 to 1992.   
 
In the second phase of television, especially following the launch of BSkyB, the value of economic 
rents to televise football took a dramatic turn. The fortuitous confluence of a newly formed elite English 
Premier League (organised in the economic interests of a smaller group of 20 clubs rather than the 92 
members of the Football League) and the content hungry new pay-TV broadcaster led to a series of 
exclusive television deals that dwarfed previous contracts for live coverage of football: £191.5m (1992-
97) and £670m (1997-01) in this phase of expansion. The popularity of live football on Sky Sports 
transformed a company that was making a £47m loss in 1992 in to a company making £67m profits a 
year later (Conn, 2012).  
 
Economically, the new cash injection in to the sport helped finance the modernisation of football 
stadiums across the country, as well as inflate the salaries of leading footballers (Horrie, 2002). With 
increased volumes of money circulating in the world of English football the game also attracted new 
investors in clubs, many of whom had moved out of private ownership to public companies with shares 
trading on the stock market. Among the investors were media companies themselves, with BSkyB, the 
cable operator NTL, and ITV franchise holder Granada among the largest investors in clubs, and the 
management of their media assets (Boyle and Haynes, 2004). The investment by media companies was 
partly triggered by regulatory investigations, first by the Office of Fair Trading in 1999 which focused 
on competition issues related to the collective sale of TV rights to Premier League football, and second, 
by the European Commission whose competition directorate DG4 also found the joint sale of rights to 
be a ‘horizontal restriction of competition’ (Toft, 2003: 8). The prospect of clubs selling their own 
television rights led the Rupert Murdoch backed BSkyB to launch a £625m takeover bid for the leading 
club of the period Manchester United in 1998. Although this may have seemed a shrewd strategic 
decision to control media rights of the Premier League’s leading club, the move proved highly 
controversial with fans and ultimately the regulator the Monopolies and Mergers Commission who 
intervened and prevented the sale on ‘public interest’ grounds. Soon after, the OFT ruled that the 
competitive market for the collective sale of Premier League rights ultimately benefited the consumer, 
but the leagues dispute with the EC rumbled on in to the third phase of British television. 
 
Digital television, the third phase of television development, radically broadened the spectrum of 
available channels and created the potential for more competition in the television marketplace. A new 
competitor to BSkyB’s dominance in football rights was ONDigital, later to be rebranded ITV Digital. 
Launched in November 1998 ONDigital was the new digital terrestrial television (DTT) license holder, 
and saw television rights to football as a key strategic aim to gain a foothold in the pay-TV marketplace 
alongside satellite and cable broadcasters. In June 2000 the television rights for the Premier League, 
the FA Cup and the Football League all came up for auction, in what turned in to a rights feeding frenzy 
among the new digital television services Sky, NTL/CableTel and ONDigital. Sky won the rights to the 
Premier League for a record fee of £1.2bn, they also picked up the FA Cup and England national 
matches, and it an effort to win at least one of the rights packages ONDigital bought the rights to the 
Football League for £315m,  four times the previous deal with Sky. The inflated cost proved the undoing 
of the DTT provider which had changed name to ITV Digital, which hit by escalating costs and falling 
revenues went in to administration in June 2002, only one year in to the three-year television deal with 
the Football League. Litigation to redeem the remainder of the fee from ITV Digital’s creditors 
ultimately failed due to a lack of parent company guarantees from Carlton and Granada, which left 
many Football League clubs facing financial ruin and administration (Boyle and Haynes, 2004).  
 
Sky’s success in seeing off competition from a rival pay-TV service was soon checked again by the 
European competition commissioner’s ruling on collecting sale of rights by the Premier League. The 
ruling failed to effect the 2004 rights sale which Sky won for £1.024bn over a three year period, but in 
2007 the Premier League were forced to break up their rights bundle in to smaller tranches to enable 
wider competition for TV rights from other providers. Irish company Setanta successfully bid for a 
share of the Premier League rights from 2007-2010 for total fee of £1.7bn, continuing the inflationary 
spiral of Premier League TV rights. As Setanta sought to broaden their presence in the television sports 
market they bought rights to Scottish football, the FA Cup and England games, Premier Rugby and the 
PGA Tour among others. Unfortunately, the cost of servicing the debt on the capital required to pay for 
the TV rights deals ultimately became too great, and in 2009 the company ceased trading in the UK and 
its various TV deals to football were auctioned off cheaply to US sports network ESPN. As with the 
collapse of ITV Digital before it, Setanta’s demise left significant financial holes in the budgets of major 
sports organisations, and football clubs, and left Sky to maintain its hegemony in the television football 
market. 
 
The beginnings of what might be characterised as a fourth phase of British television centre’s on the 
development of Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) services which began to be marketed in the UK 
during the first decade of the 21st century when telecommunications companies, such as BT Vision, 
began to provide television packages using its broadband service from 2006. BT Vision carried live 
pay-TV football via deals with Setanta and subsequently ESPN, and from Sky Sports following a ruling 
by regulator Ofcom in July 2010 which forced BSkyB to reduce the wholesale price of its premium 
sports channels by 23.4% which were previously viewed as a form of restrictive practice against 
competitors. Buoyed by renewed competition in sports rights, BT’s most significant move in the world 
of televised football came in 2012 when it successfully won the rights to 38 live Premier League 
matches per season from 2013-16. Most crucially, this included the right for 18 ‘first choice’ matches. 
This initial deal, worth £738m, was modestly expanded further to 42 games per season from 2016-2019 
for £960m. The most dramatic strategic change to live football rights in the UK came with BT Sports 
exclusive acquisition of UEFA Champions League games in 2013 for £897m. The move broke nearly 
two decades of dominance by ITV and Sky in the coverage of the competition in the UK, and moved 
BT in alignment with sky in terms of its attractiveness to pay-TV customers. The fierce competition for 
television rights to premium football between Sky and BT has emphasised the importance of sport to 
drive new customers in to their businesses. BT’s key strategic move has been to bundle its sports 
channel offering free with broadband and telephony services. This ‘triple play’ of television, broadband 
and telephony now characterises the entertainment and telecommunications market in the UK, where 
inflated rights to premium sport content has become a ‘loss leader’ to lucrative digital media household 
markets which are now more complex and diverse in their offers. In to this new digital media landscape 
global Internet corporations such as Google (via YouTube), Facebook, Netflix and Amazon are also 
competing to deliver Video-on-Demand and Over-The-Top services which also have the capacity to 
stream or broadcast live sports content. In this respect, the market for premium live televised football 
in the UK is likely to remain complex and constantly in flux for the foreseeable future. 
 
History of French Television Football Rights 
The French position is quite similar to the UK case. A public monopoly on broadcasting existed 
from 1945 to 1974 with the Radiodiffusion Française (RDF) until 1949 before the 
Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (RTF) until 1964 then the Office de Radiodiffusion-
Télévision Française (ORTF). From 1964-1965, televised live matches occurred in French 
football. However, on 8 November 1969, Lyon-Rennes which was televised live took place in 
front of only 894 attendees. This led to the end of televised live matches in French football for 
15 years. In 1975, the ORTF fractured in three TV channels (TF1, Antenne 2 and FR3) but, as 
underlined by Bourg (1998, p. 213), “competition is weak because all three pertain to public 
service, are not commercial companies and they agree to harmonise their schedule (sharing of 
sports broadcasts on weekend with Saturday reserved for Antenne 2 and Sunday for TF1)”. 
In 1977-1978, TF1 began to broadcast ‘Téléfoot’ (match highlights) for an amount of €69,000 
(Wikipédia, 2) or €107,000 (Hinho, 2015). Pleased with its audiences during its initial season, 
TF1 offered €229,000 in 1978-1979 then €1.37 million for three seasons in 1979 and kept 
‘Téléfoot’ in spite of competition from Antenne 2 in 1979 which proposed €762,000 
(Wikipédia, 3). From 1982, the French television market evolved towards a competitive 
business with the lifting of the ceiling on advertising revenue for channels (Bourg & Gouguet, 
2001). Above all, a new TV channel appeared in 1984: Canal Plus. As soon as 1984-1985, the 
latter agreed a deal to broadcast live French football matches. Since then, they have been 
regularly televised live. 
 
Independent variables of the amount for TV rights 
 
Beyond the descriptive historical approach above, it is necessary to identify independent 
variables of the amount for TV rights so as to apply them or some of them to our following 
analysis. Bolotny and Bourg (2006) provide a useful representation of the two markets of sport 
and television and the independent variables of the amount for broadcasting rights (see Figure 
1). The two markets are the broadcasting rights market where holders of rights (supply) and 
TV channels (demand) meet, and the sports programmes market where TV channels (supply) 
and viewers or consumers (demand) meet. A set of independent variables is given, among 
which four are of particular interest in this article (framed within Figure 1): the characteristics 
of the sporting event, the structure of the TV market, the financial situation of subscription 
channels and the penetration of the sport in society (practice and watching with a focus on the 
latter in this article). The degree of league cohesion is also important but since 2015-2016, the 
Spanish La Liga has adopted a collective sale of TV rights, meaning that all five main European 
football leagues (England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) have such a formula. This has 
always been the case in England and France as in the USA since the Sports Broadcasting Act 
1961. 
An additional dimension to be incorporated is the rest of the world since international TV rights 
can be of prime importance for a league as exemplified by the EPL. This means that the two 
markets of sport and television and their three actors can be reproduced for different countries, 
with the same holders of rights as initially but other TV channels (except for those that are in 
different countries) and viewers. In the same time, domestic TV channels and viewers can be 
interested in foreign leagues. As such, different holders of football rights (football leagues) are 
in competition for TV rights, even if TV viewers have preferences for watching competitors 
and clubs from their own countries (Gratton & Solberg, 2007). Football leagues are also in 
competition on how they use TV rights. Indeed, their increase is associated with an increase in 
player salaries both in the USA and Europe, and in transfer fees in Europe (Andreff, 2009, 
2012; Andreff & Bourg, 2006; Quirk & Fort, 1997). As such, a league with more TV rights 
will be more likely to attract the best players even if this depends on a set of variables, mainly: 
domestic rules about TV rights sharing between different sports organisations (in France, TV 
rights for the first two football divisions are grouped together then shared between them – with 
a smaller percentage of TV revenue for the Ligue 1 than what it generates – but also with 





The framework developed here is based on the core claims below for a domestic TV channel 
and a domestic league. The main variables we will focus on in the following analysis are 
numbered and in bold. Initially, we consider that the domestic TV channel is alone on the 
market or has largely more market power than the other channels and no real competition. Its 
starting point is to meet the demand from domestic TV viewers that can be considered as 
watching the best possible matches, preferentially in their domestic league and with domestic 
players: 
 So as to meet the demand from TV viewers, the TV channel’s objective is to broadcast the 
best possible matches thus the best clubs and players in the world (1; Buraimo & 
Simmons, 2015), including the best domestic players (2; Gratton & Solberg, 2007). 
 
Figure 1 Independent variables of the amount for broadcasting rights (Bolotny & Bourg, 2006, p. 113) 
 Having the best players requires being able to pay the best salaries so domestic clubs needs 
more revenue than foreign clubs1. 
 A TV channel is ready to spend more money if it has the financial ability (3) to do so, the 
football domestic league is a core product (4) for it and this allows domestic clubs to attract 
the best players in the world, meaning that these clubs must already have revenue 
comparable or close to foreign clubs. 
 As a consequence, domestic clubs need large investments and revenue beyond domestic 
TV rights (5) to attract even more of the latter. 
 In particular, domestic clubs need large stadium attendance (6), which is also required for 
telegenic purposes thus by the TV channel (a large crowd is more likely to generate a great 
atmosphere with a positive impact on TV viewers’ experience). 
 Having the best clubs and players should lead to continental competitiveness (7) for its 
domestic league, which should increase its perceived quality by TV viewers and sporting 
prizes (a better continental performance means more positions qualifying for the European 
competitions in the domestic league) thus be beneficial for the TV channel. 
 Continental competitiveness is also required per se by the TV channel as it usually 
broadcasts continental matches and their audiences are better with successful domestic 
clubs. 
 At the end, we reintroduce competition between TV channels so a TV channel also needs 
to offer more money than its domestic competitors (8) to get TV rights. 
For a domestic league: 
 Its objective is to have the best possible matches and competitive clubs in continental 
competitions, consistent with TV channels and viewers’ expectations. 
 Competitive domestic clubs in continental competitions can require that a few clubs or even 
only one club – the driving force (9) – has the best players, contradictory with the necessity 
of outcome uncertainty which is well documented in the literature (Andreff & Scelles, 
2015; Scelles, Durand, Bonnal, Goyeau & Andreff, 2013a, 2013b), and especially the 
necessity of uncertainty for the title (10) (Scelles, 2016; Scelles et al., 2015). 
 The league needs a sufficiently equalitarian sharing of its TV rights to generate outcome 
uncertainty and / or to limit its number of clubs (11) so as to avoid that some have too 
limited financial resources compared to others and / or to make sure that its best clubs will 
                                                 
1
 To simplify, we do not consider domestic taxes. 
benefit from a large amount of TV rights. Besides, fewer clubs means fewer matchdays, 
which is better for TV channels as it is likely that more matches will be played on weekends 
with a positive impact on audiences (Buraimo & Simmons, 2015). 
 The league needs to optimise its TV rights to be able to have both competitive and relatively 
equal clubs, at least for its best clubs. 
 TV rights optimisation needs domestic but also international TV rights optimisation with 
the selling and marketing of these rights by sports promoters operating in an increasingly 
global marketplace (Boyle & Haynes, 2002). 
 International TV rights optimisation requires reaching a maximum number of countries. 
 Reaching a maximum number of countries is partially consistent with having the best 
players in the world (reaching the countries with the best players in the world) but also 
suggests attracting players from markets with high potential for TV rights (12) (Gratton, 
Liu, Ramchandani & Wilson, 2012), even if these players are not among the best in the 
world. It is worth noting that this strategy can be temporal: once a market is interested in a 
league, it may be not necessary to attract players coming from this market anymore.  
 A league can generate more competition with an appropriate packaging (13) (Bolotny & 
Bourg, 2006; Gratton & Solberg, 2007). 
 The number of live games (14) offered by the league can also increase competition. 
 Timing (15) is also important: should a league negotiate TV rights just before a new period 
or earlier? 
 At the end, the league also needs to be able to allocate as many TV rights as possible to its 
clubs (no need to allocate a part of them to clubs in other divisions / sports), which is related 
to its independency (16). Thus, French TV rights are shared not only between first division 




Based on the previous criteria, the objective is to compare the evolution of TV rights in English 
and French football over the period 1980-2020. Although no TV rights were paid for live 
matches before 1983, the criteria will be analysed for the sub-period 1980-1983. The reason is 
that TV rights for a given period are related, among other causes, to the quality of a league and 
what happened in terms of TV competition during the previous period. The methodology is 
based on correlations between TV rights and their possible explanatory variables. Some have 
explicit values (e.g. attendance) but for most of them, it is necessary to consider whether a 
criterion is met or not, allocating a value according to this (1 if met, 0 if not). As some criteria 
are not fully met, not fully not met, they will be allocated 0.5. So as to evaluate as objectively 
as possible the different variables, clear and consistent rules have to be set (the main source for 
the data is Wikipedia in English or Wikipédia in French; if another source is used, it is 
mentioned in brackets): 
1. Quality of foreign players: 1 if best players in the world, 0.5 if not all best players in the 
world, 0 otherwise (sources: Wikipedia/Wikipédia). 
2. Quality of domestic players: 1 if evidence (qualification for the main national team 
competitions, the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Euro) and best domestic players in the 
domestic league, 0.5 if evidence but not all best domestic players in the domestic league, 0 
if no evidence or evidence but most of the best players not in the domestic league. 
3. TV channel’s financial ability: turnover. 
4. Football domestic league = core product: audiences. 
5. Ability to attract investors and revenues beyond TV rights: 1 if dominant league from an 
economic point of view without taking into account TV rights or evidence of large 
investments, 0.5 if ability without being the dominant league or evidence of large 
investments, 0 otherwise. 
6. Stadium attendance: data from European Football Statistics. 
7. Continental competitiveness: data from Kassies. 
8. Competition between TV channels: 1 if at least three competitors, 0.5 if two, 0 if only one. 
9. At least one economically and sportingly strong team, the driving force: 1 if met, 0 if not. 
10. Convincing domestic rivals so as to generate uncertainty for the title: 1 if at least two rivals 
or only one rival but with high potential (e.g. high attendance / big city), 0.5 if only one 
rival with limited potential (e.g. low attendance / small city), 0 if not. 
11. Appropriate number of clubs: this depends on several factors such as the position of the 
league and its best clubs in the economic continental hierarchy as a strongly dominant 
league can have more clubs sharing its TV rights without compromising its best clubs’ 
economic position; or the number of weekends / holidays when matchdays can be organised 
(e.g. Boxing Day in the UK). 
12. Markets with high potential for TV rights: 1 if Asia and the United States are reached, 0.5 
if only one of these two markets is reached or none of them but some others with good 
potential (e.g. France for the English Premier League), 0 otherwise. As an alternative for 
the quality of foreign players and players from markets with potential for TV rights, we 
will also consider the percentage of foreign players (Andreff, 2012; Gratton et al., 2012; 
Gratton & Solberg, 2007; Pautot, 2014). This percentage is supposed to have been highly 
impacted by the Bosman case (1995). 
13. Packaging: number of packages. 
14. Number of live games. 
15. Timing: how long before? It is worth noting that timing impacts the information that has to 
be taken into account for our criteria. Indeed, if TV rights in period t were negotiated one 
year before the new deal, the last season of period t-1 has not to be considered as it cannot 
influence these TV rights; if TV rights depend on the number of current TV viewers as it 
was the case in French football between 1984 and 1987 (Wikipédia, 2), this is period t that 
has to be taken into account to explain TV rights in t. 
16. Independency: 1 if met or to come, 0.5 if signs that this could occur, 0 if not. 
For the criteria taking the values 1, 0.5 or 0, the decision to allocate a specific value can be 
straightforward or a matter of qualitative assessment based on available and collected evidence. 
Such evidence is provided in Appendices so that the reader can understand the rationale behind 
our choices. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Brief description of the evolution of TV rights 
 
First of all, we briefly describe the evolution of TV rights in English and French men’s football 
first divisions over the period 1980-2020. Figure 2 shows the huge increase for England, 
particularly from 2007 with the gap with France having always increased since then (the 
decrease for England in 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 is due to the parity pound-euro, not an actual 
decrease in pounds as annual TV rights were the same over the period 2007-2010). From 1997 
to 2007, TV rights were always larger in England than France but the latter was able to partially 
fill the gap when it increased. It is difficult to really know how TV rights evolved before 1997 
based on Figure 2. This is the reason why Figure 3 focuses on the period 1980-1997 only. 
During the latter, TV rights were much closer between the two leagues with the French league 
being able to fill the gap appeared in 1992-1993, when the Premier League was created and 
Sky won TV rights for the first time, at the end of the period. 
 
 
Figure 2 Evolution of TV rights in English and French men’s football first divisions, 1980-2020 
 
 
Figure 3 Evolution of TV rights in English and French men’s football first divisions, 1980-1997 
 
Data and correlations 
 
Table 1 provides the data related to TV rights and their supposed explanatory variables (n = 27 
observations; 13 for England and 14 for France). For qualitative details about the data, see 
Appendices 1 to 4. Unfortunately, all annual domestic audiences could not be found. As a 
consequence, all average domestic audiences could not be calculated, that’s why they are not 
reported here. However, domestic audiences are discussed in a dedicated subsection later. Data 
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rights in t+1 are determined mainly by elements in t, except for those specified here and in 
France from 1984 to 1987 (see explanation for timing in the methodology section). Based on 
the elements in Table 1, one might have the feeling that most of the explanatory variables have 
improved in parallel with TV rights, especially for England. The best way to confirm this is to 
observe the correlations between variables. 
Table 2 shows that most of the explanatory variables have a significant positive impact on TV 
rights (the negative sign for UEFA ranking means a positive impact as it is better to be ranked 
1st than 2nd which is better than 3rd and so on). The variables that have not a significant impact 
on TV rights are the number of live games, the quality of domestic players, driving force, 
domestic rivals, the number of clubs and an appropriate number of clubs. For driving force and 
domestic rivals, a main reason is that almost all periods have a value equal to 1, meaning that 
these two variables are not sufficiently discriminating in England and France over time. For 
the number of clubs, a reason is that 20 clubs in England is not the same as 20 clubs in France 
given their respective situation (England more likely to share TV rights between 20 clubs with 
limited economic impact on its best clubs regarding its economic position and its 
independency) and more attractive possibilities for broadcasting games in England due to the 
absence of a winter lull. When considering an appropriate number of clubs for England alone, 
there is a significant positive impact. There is also a significant positive impact of the number 
of live games for England alone. Interestingly, there is a significant negative impact of the 
quality of domestic players for France alone. An explanation is that TV rights increased after 
the 1998 World Cup in and won by France but also after the Euro 2000 also won by France, 
whereas most of its best players left the domestic league after the Bosman case in 1995. This 
could translate an increase in football demand from French people due to France national men’s 
football team success, independent of whether the best French players operate in the domestic 
league or not. This interpretation is consistent with the increase in overall audiences for the 
French football first division over the period 1998-2002, when 306 games were broadcasted 
per season (all games with 18 clubs): from 49m in 1998-1999 to 92m in 2001-2002 (almost 
doubled).  
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TV rights in 












0.78** 0.82** 0.55** 0.59** 
Timing for 
TV rights in 
t+1 




  0.75** 0.38 -0.40* 0.25 -0.04 0.28 -0.41* 0.37 -0.35 -0.63** -0.38* -0.40* 0.45* 0.52** 0.75** -0.08 
Number of 








     0.41* 0.61** 0.44* -0.44* 0.40* 0.20 0.36 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.24 -0.02 0.63** 
Turnover       0.58** 0.85** -0.44* 0.71** 0.04 0.06 -0.23 0.33 0.88** 0.89** 0.63** 0.78** 
Economic 
position        0.54** -0.49** 0.46* 0.26 0.17 -0.01 0.33 0.62** 0.62** 0.33 0.64** 
Attendance         -0.36 0.75** -0.02 0.002 0.04 0.04 0.88** 0.81** 0.68** 0.83** 
UEFA 
ranking          -0.31 0.09 0.14 0.39* -0.14 -0.51** -0.59** -0.59** -0.24 
Competition           -0.05 -0.09 -0.12 0.07 0.68** 0.69** 0.63** 0.77** 
Driving 
force            -0.07 0.04 0.26 -0.09 -0.06 -0.19 0.14 
Domestic 
rivals             0.08 0.46* -0.17 -0.20 -0.34 0.25 
Number of 




              0.13 0.22 0.03 0.36 
Internatio-
nal markets                0.96** 0.78** 0.70** 
% of foreign 
players                 0.85** 0.63** 
Bosman case                  0.42* 
 
* and ** mean significant at the 5% and 1% threshold, respectively. 
Main TV channel’s turnover 
 
The explanatory variable with the strongest correlation with TV rights is the main TV channel’s 
turnover. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the turnover for Sky in the UK and Ireland and Canal 
+ in France over the period 1990-2015, from seven times larger for Canal + in 1990-1991 to 
five times and a half larger for Sky in the UK and Ireland in 2014-2015. The very strong 
correlation between TV rights and main TV channel’s turnover suggests the possibility of a 
virtuous circle: broadcasting football games allows a TV channel to increase its customer base 
and its turnover, meaning that it can invest in turn more money in football so that clubs can 
attract better players (consistent with the strong correlation between the main TV channel’s 
turnover and the percentage of foreign players, the strongest between explanatory variables), 
increasing the attractiveness of the league and thus new customers for the TV channel. This is 
what happened in English football (even if Sky decreased its investment for the period 2004-
2007 when it did not face competition) but not in French football. A reason is competition 
between English and French football, with the latter not able to spend as much money in players 
as the former. This means that English clubs can attract the best players operating in the French 
league. It is worth noting that English clubs can rely not only on large domestic TV rights but 
also large international TV rights, including from France and, until 2016, Canal +. Thus, the 
French TV group provided €63m per season for the EPL over the period 2013-2016.  
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As written earlier, we could not find all annual domestic audiences. Nevertheless, some of them 
could be accessed over the period 1996-2014 (Table 3). From 2000-2001 to 2003-2004, overall 
audiences for France were larger than England but its average audiences were four to five times 
smaller. In 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, overall audiences were even smaller for France in spite 
of much more broadcast games (380 versus 88 for England). In 2006-2007, overall audiences 
were again larger for France then England increased its number of broadcast games (to 137 in 
2007-2008) and even if this number was still smaller than France, overall audiences for England 
were larger again. The fact that the French Professional League (LFP) has stopped the 
publication of Ligue 1 overall audiences from 2008-2009 lets think that they have decreased 
compared to 2007-2008. In 2012-2013, the average audience for the main game of each 
matchday (38 games) decreased to 1.1m in Ligue 1, an average not strongly larger than the one 
for the 154 broadcast games (four times more games) in EPL in 2013-2014. This is consistent 
with the idea that EPL has much more games with high potential for large audiences than the 
French Ligue 1. In the French context, it is also important to consider the development of the 
rugby Top 14, able to achieve an average domestic audience for all its games (not only for the 
main game of each matchday) between 700,000 and 800,000 over the period 2008-2013 in spite 
of days or at least times not as optimal as for football (Autorité de la concurrence, 2014). Top 
14 average audiences were slightly decreasing in 2013-2014, a decrease mainly due to “a very 
strong competition from the Premier League that year” (Autorité de la concurrence, 2014, p. 
25). 
 
Table 3 Domestic audiences in English and French men’s football first divisions over the period 1996-2014 (in 
million) 
 Overall Average 
 England France England France 
1996-1997 91.2 - 1.52 - 
1997-1998 - - - - 
1998-1999 - 49.2 - 0.16 
1999-2000 - 57.5 - 0.19 
2000-2001 65.4 83.0 1.09 0.27 
2001-2002 77.2 92.1 1.17 0.30 
2002-2003 89.8 104.5 1.36 0.28 
2003-2004 89.8 105.5 1.36 0.28 
2004-2005 107.4 105.6 1.22 0.28 
2005-2006 106.5 103.7 1.21 0.27 
2006-2007 103.8 111.3 1.18 0.29 
2007-2008 134.3 112.5 0.98 0.30 
2008-2009 - 64.61 - 1.71 
2009-2010 - 57.01 - 1.51 
2010-2011 - 60.81 - 1.61 
2011-2012 - 53.21 - 1.41 
2012-2013 - 41.81 - 1.11 
2013-2014 160.9 - 1.04 - 
 
1 Main game of each matchday only. 
Sources: Autorité de la concurrence (2014), Buraimo & Simmons (2015), Gratton & Solberg (2007, pp. 33-34), 
Harris (2014), LNF / LFP 
 
English Premier League’s virtuous circle 
 
A lot of explanatory variables are positively correlated, suggesting the existence of a virtuous 
circle, at least for the English Premier League. Such a virtuous circle is represented in Figure 
5. This can be simplified as follows: independency and competition between TV channels => 
more money => better clubs => more potential live games => more competition between TV 
channels => more money. Before commenting further on Figure 5, we remind that English club 
football was in a very bad situation in the 1980s: attendances were falling down (from more 
than 31,000 in 1972 to less than 19,000 in 1984) due to old stadia and hooliganism; English 
clubs have been banned from European competitions for five years following the Heysel 
disaster in 1985; and the Hillsborough disaster in 1989 was the most serious tragedy in UK 
sporting history. The latter induced the Taylor Report (1990) which eventually led to all-seat 
arenas from 1994-1995. The Taylor Report was one determining factor triggering the English 
Premier League success, along with English clubs coming back in European competitions in 
1990 (meaning that top positions in the league could qualify again for continental 
competitions), and independency and Sky winning TV rights in 1992. The Bosman Case (1995) 
and the Euro 1996 in England were two other beneficial factors during the 1990s as was the 
evolution of the Champions League from only one club per country (except if its winner was 
not champion in its domestic league) to four clubs for the best countries from 1999, along with 
more money shared on the basis of the TV pool (TV domestic market) rather than sporting 
performance and equality between countries. In 2003, Sky faced no competition for national 
TV rights that slightly decreased for the period 2004-2007 in spite of more than twice more 
broadcasted games. This was “seen by many as an indicator that the boom time for 
broadcasting rights was over” (Gratton & Solberg, 2007, p. 5). However, the European 
Commission insisted that at least one of the packages offered for the period 2007-2010 went to 
a different broadcaster. This generated again competition between TV channels which is even 
more intense with BT being in the market since 2012. 
 
 
Figure 5 English Premier League’s virtuous circle: positive influence of independency, domestic and European 




This article has looked for comparing the evolution of TV rights in English and French men’s 
football first divisions over the period 1980-2020. The literature review provided some 
variables explaining TV rights, with an emphasis on four elements here: the characteristics of 
the sporting event, the structure of the TV market, the financial situation of subscription 
channels and the penetration of the sport in society (watching). A framework was then 
developed, taking into account the four previous elements. Based on this, a comparison between 
the English Premier League and the French Ligue 1 has been made, showing and explaining 
why TV rights for the former have become much larger than for the latter. This can be 
summarised as follows: larger domestic audiences for the EPL leading to larger revenues for 
Sky in the United Kingdom and Ireland than Canal + in France with a greater incentive to invest 
money in TV rights due to more competition leading to better players so better games and larger 
audiences; and much larger international TV rights for the EPL than for the French Ligue 1 due 
to the quality of the games and the ability to “sell” the league internationally, in particular in 
attracting international players. 
Based on the current conversion rate between the British pound and the US dollar (£1 = $1.44), 
the annual TV rights for the EPL over the period 2016-2019 would be equivalent to $4bn versus 
$5bn for the NFL over the period 2014-2021. This means that the EPL would have almost filled 
the gap whereas in 1990, the NFL generated $900m per year in TV rights against less than 
$20m for the English Football League (more than 45 times less). It is worth noting that if we 
already know the amount for TV rights for the French Ligue 1 in 2019-2020, this is not the case 
for the EPL. During that season, it could be envisaged that TV rights for the EPL becomes as 
high as those for the NFL or even higher. Whether this would be the case or not, EPL TV rights 
are already causing concern in European men’s football as the budgets of all 20 EPL clubs will 
be greater than most of their overseas counterparts who compete at the top end of their domestic 
leagues (Jackson, 2016). As a consequence, UEFA would be considering a major revamp of 
the Champions League with a possible move to a larger group format, allowing the established 
continental clubs to have more high-profile games and thus generate a bigger income. This 
could be seen as a first step towards a European Super League. In any event, European men’s 
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Appendix 1 TV rights and characteristics of English and French football first divisions over the period 1980-1987 
 1980-1983 1983-1984 1984-1985 1985-1986 1986-1987 
 England France England France England France England France England France 
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TF1 & Canal + 
£3.15m (€4.8m) 
BBC & ITV 
€9.9m1 
TF1 & Canal + 
Timing rights t+1 1983 1982 or 1983 1983 1984-1985 1985 1985-1986 1986 1986-1987 1988 1987 
Driving force(s) Liverpool Saint-Etienne (till 
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British record transfer 
fee = £1.5m in 1981 
(Robson, Manchester 
United) vs £3m for 
Maradona from Boca 




club on the stock 
exchange in 1983 
Bez (Bordeaux) 
Effect of 
Tottenham on the 
stock exchange 
£5m for Maradona 
from FC Barcelona 
to Napoli 





£6m for Gullit 
from PSV 
Eindhoven to AC 
Milan in 1987 
Quality of 
domestic players3 
Good UEFA ranking 
with a limited number 
of foreign players 
A few players abroad 
Semi-finalist in 
1982 World Cup 
Six abroad except 
in 1981, Platini 
abroad from 1982 
Platini 3rd Ballon 
d’or 1980, 4th 
1981, 9th 1982 
Giresse 2nd 1982 
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ranking with a 
limited number of 
foreign players 
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abroad 
Dalglish 2nd 
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limited number of 
foreign players 
A few players 
abroad 
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d’or 1984 
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after Euro 1984 
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abroad 
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England 5-8 1986 
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1986 World Cup 




for Euro 1988 
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1 Authors’ estimation. 2 Initially £4.75m refused by clubs. 3 UK and Irish players instead of English players only for England as national TV rights are sold to UK and Irish channels. 
  
Appendix 2 TV rights and characteristics of English and French football first divisions over the period 1987-2001 
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1 Authors’ estimation. 2 ‘Club Europe’: Bordeaux, Lens, Lyon, Marseille, Monaco and Paris. 3 UK and Irish players instead of English players only for England as national TV rights are sold to UK and Irish channels.
 
Appendix 3 TV rights and characteristics of English and French football first divisions over the period 2001-
2008 
 2001-2002 2002-2004 2004-2005 2005-2007 2007-2008 
 England France 
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1 ‘Club Europe’: Bordeaux, Lens, Lyon, Marseille, Monaco and Paris. 
2 Canal + won exclusive TV rights in November 2002 for the 2004-2007 period but this was cancelled by the French Competition Council in 
January 2003. 
3 UK and Irish players instead of English players only for England as national TV rights are sold to UK and Irish channels.
 
 
Appendix 4 TV rights and characteristics of English and French football first divisions over the period 2008-2020 
 2008-2010 2010-2012 2012-2013 2013-2016 2016-2020 
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Paris SG effect 
68% of foreign 
players in 2013-
2014 
41% of foreign 
players (40% in 
2014-2015) 
Ibrahimovic 4th 
Ballon d’or 2013, 
Falcao, James 
Rodriguez 
70% of foreign 
players? 
Best players in 
Premier League? 
40% of foreign 
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1 Authors’ estimation. 
2 UK and Irish players instead of English players only for England as national TV rights are sold to UK and Irish channels. 
